Yekaterina Oziashvili

It is often said that all politics is economics. The aim of this course is to show that all economics is politics. Though economists and policymakers often present their economic policy decisions and views as neutral—based solely on abstract mathematical models, guided by the laws of nature (or the “invisible hand” of the market)—they are, in fact, driven by transparent political ends and ideology. In this class, we will question the frequently proclaimed universality, neutrality, and inevitability of economic principles and policies through a close examination of liberal and neoliberal ideology and the ways in which it limits political discourse, reforms, and development. We will look at the origins of capitalism. We will examine the economic and political origins and consequences of shock therapy in Latin America and Eastern Europe, structural adjustment policies in countries suffering from economic crisis, and austerity measures imposed by the Troika on Greece and other states in the European Union. We’ll also look at socioeconomic explanations for the recent rise of populist parties and politicians and, especially, popular support for the far right. Some of the questions that we will explore include: What is the role of international economic institutions in domestic and international affairs? How do the interactions between international and domestic institutions and actors determine the production and distribution of scarce resources? And what is the relationship between capitalism and democracy and between international financial institutions and national sovereignty?

Thomas Hobbes believed that the State, or what he called the Leviathan, was the necessary result of individuals trying to escape from a state of nature, where existence was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Charles Tilly compared states to racketeers; Vladimir Lenin, following the lead of Marx and Engels, wrote that the State exists to maintain the domination and oppression of one class by another. John F. Kennedy famously proclaimed, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country,” demanding Americans’ unquestioning, altruistic loyalty to the State. And for about two centuries, communists, socialists, anarchists, and social democrats have debated whether the State must be reformed, overthrown, or abolished in the name of democracy, equality, and popular sovereignty. These different and often contradictory approaches reveal that there is no common agreement on the nature or role of the State. So, what is the State? Where did it come from? What are the sources and limits of its power? Why does it have so much control over our lives? These are the questions that we’ll ask in this class. We will pay special attention to the relationship between the development of the modern state and capitalism; the rise of the welfare state, the epitome of modern state power; and state violence. We’ll discuss alternative visions of the State’s role and responsibility and ask: Do we need the State, and can we make the State work for us?

The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the posthistorical period, there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed. —Francis Fukuyama, The End of History.

In 1989, as liberal capitalist democracy appeared to be the only game in town, Francis Fukuyama predicted the end of history. For him, it was bound to be an age of boredom. Meanwhile, liberal and neoliberal theory proponents predicted greater economic interdependence and cooperation among states and other actors in the international system. They argued that as states accepted liberal democracy and capitalism, opened their borders to trade, and embraced the free market, everyone would benefit from economic prosperity and “liberal peace.” Ironically, the end of history has proven surprisingly eventful. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc has resulted in multiple armed conflicts in postsocialist Eastern Europe. Some observers have dismissed these conflicts merely as the price for joining the posthistorical world of liberal democracies. Yet, increasing disappointment with mainstream (neo)liberal parties and the growing popularity of antiestablishment parties, both on the right and on the left, do not fit comfortably with the narrative of postideological boredom. Neither are Brexit and heated debates over Grexit and separatist movements in Scotland and Catalonia compatible with (neo)liberal theories of convergence and of growing importance of international alliances. What is evident is that many of the tensions and fundamental contradictions of liberalism are far from having been resolved. The end of history has turned out to be a time of major political and economic upheavals. From global financial crises to the growing popularity of the radical right and the illiberal fascination with nativism, xenophobia, and racism, the West seems to be in the very midst of history after all—and the future looks more chaotic than ever. In this yearlong class, we will study the new rise of competing ideologies, nationalist movements, and exit from liberal alliances that threaten to tear Europe apart and attempt to understand their sources and potential implications. We’ll discuss how nationalist movements and the eventual collapse of the Eastern Bloc were associated, paradoxically, with the rejection of nationalism as a serious challenge to liberalism. We’ll ask why Eastern European secessionist and other nationalist movements were praised as liberalism- and democracy-promoting, while their Western counterparts are seen as reactionary, anti-democratic, and illiberal. Overall, we will attempt to understand the challenges that contemporary politics pose to liberal predictions of growth, peace, and international cooperation after the so-called end of history.

It is often said that all politics is economics. The aim of this course is to show that all economics is politics. Though economists and policymakers often present their economic policy decisions and views as neutral—based solely on abstract mathematical models, guided by the laws of nature (or the “invisible hand” of the market)—they are, in fact, driven by sometimes surprisingly transparent political ends and ideology. In this class, we will question the frequently proclaimed universality, neutrality, and inevitability of economic principles and policies through a close examination of neoliberal ideology and the ways in which it limits political discourse, reforms, and development. Specifically, we will examine the economic and political origins and consequences of shock therapy in Latin America and Eastern Europe, structural adjustment policies in countries suffering from economic crisis, and austerity measures imposed by the Troika on Greece and other states in the European Union. We’ll also look at socioeconomic explanations for the recent rise of populist parties and political candidates. Some of the questions that we will explore include: What is the role of international economic institutions in domestic and international affairs? How do the interactions between international and domestic institutions and actors determine the production and distribution of scarce resources? And what is the relationship between capitalism and democracy, conditional lending and democratization, and international institutions and national sovereignty?

Writing about the democratic transitions and ethnic conflicts that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Holocaust survivor and writer Elie Wiesel pessimistically declared in his 2002 novel, The Judges, that “the malevolent ghosts of hatred are resurgent with a fury and a boldness that are as astounding as they are nauseating: ethnic conflicts, religious riots, anti-Semitic incidents here, there, and everywhere. What is wrong with these morally degenerate people that they abuse their freedom, so recently won?” Although written from a perspective of moral outrage, one would be hard-pressed to find a quote that more accurately illuminates both the sense of severity associated with ethnic conflict, broadly defined, and the absolute lack of understanding of its causes. Indeed, the end of the Cold War was seen by many conservative and liberal thinkers as “the end of history” and the beginning of a steady march toward global political stability and peace. Yet, despite an explosion in the number of electoral democracies, the frequency and intensity of bloody and brutal scenes of ethnic violence seemed to belie all expectations. The proliferation of such violence over the last 30 years has thus caused many scholars and policymakers to more critically examine their assumptions about the sources and potential solutions to the issue of ethnic conflict as an international problem. Despite significant evidence to the contrary, commentators like Wiesel—and even many politicians—still frequently attribute the sources of such strife to the existence of “morally degenerate people,” ethnic diversity, or the history of animosity between various ethnic communities. Looking at the problem from a more holistic perspective—which engages with the economic, cultural, and political motivations underlying ethnic conflict—this course will challenge these commonly-held assumptions about the cause of ethnic violence and explore some possible solutions for preventing further conflicts or resolving existing ones. We will devote special attention to the relationship/s between democratization and ethnic conflict, because democracy promotion is one of the key foreign policy goals embraced (at least rhetorically) by many democratic states, including the United States. Some of the questions that this course will address include: What are the main sources behind political conflicts deemed “ethnic”? What is the role of the international community in managing ethnic conflicts? What is the effect of democratization on territorial integrity and political conflict between ethnically divided communities? What constitutional designs, state structures, and electoral systems are most compatible with ethnically divided societies? What is the role of humanitarian interventions, and are they successful?

War made the state, and the state made war. —Charles Tilly

This course will take a critical approach to the study of international relations. First, we will study the main theories (e.g., realism, liberalism, constructivism, and Marxism); concepts (e.g., the state, anarchy, sovereignty, balance of power, dependency, hegemony, and world order); and levels of analysis (systemic, state, organizational, and individual) in the field. Then, we will apply those various theoretical approaches and levels of analysis to current international conflicts and crises in order to better understand the many ongoing debates about war and peace, humanitarian interventions, international institutions, and the international political economy. Some of the questions that we will explore include: Why do states go to war? Why do some humanitarian interventions succeed while others fail or simply never materialize? Why are some regions and states rich while others are poor, and how do those inequalities shape international relations? How do international organizations help to reinforce or moderate existing interstate political and economic inequalities?

There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen. —V. I. Lenin.

The first two decades of the 21st century have been decades of uprisings. Looking at images of protesters filling the streets of Paris, France, or Santiago, Chile, it’s hard to believe that, in 1989, Frances Fukuyama famously proclaimed the end of history, delivered by the final victory of liberalism over competing ideologies. He concluded: “The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.” The 1990s, indeed, seemed to confirm Fukuyama’s predictions. Liberal ideology—with its promarket, technocratic, and anti-democratic policies—left no space for politics or resistance. Margaret Thatcher’s infamous argument that “There Is No Alternative” became a posthistorical axiom rather than an ideological position. But in Belgrade on October 5, 2000, a state radio/television station was charged by a heavy equipment machine, beginning a series of Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe; and just like that, the post-historical period of boredom was over. In this class, we will look at a series of uprisings that have taken the early 21st century by storm. We will start with the Colour Revolutions, move on to the Arab Spring and the Occupy movement, and end with more recent uprisings—including the Yellow Vests in France, independence movements in Catalonia and Hong Kong, and anti-austerity protests in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. Some of those movements organized in opposition to corrupt and undemocratic governments or fake elections; others, in response to democratic governments’ lack of consideration for the livelihood of the working people and dominance of capital over human beings and environment. Not all of those movements were ultimately emancipatory projects, however, and their demands and tactics have been radically different. This class will look at the differences and similarities between the movements and ask: What can we learn from those uprisings, and what is next?